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The Commerce Clause has long been a constitutional power-
house underlying federal legislation.' The recent decision in
United States v. Lopez' marks the first time in almost sixty
years that the Supreme Court has held that Congress had ex-
ceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce.3 In Lopez, the
Court held that Congress overreached its power in enacting the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,' which prohibited posses-
* BA, J.D., Northwestern University. Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk
University of Law. The author thanks Gerry Clark and Linda Sandstrom Simard for
helpful comments.
1. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion
striking down the statute in question, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1625.
3. The Court had not held since 1937 that Congress had enacted a statute
beyond the scope of the commerce power, and had so held only eight times.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 307 n.8 (2d ed. 1988)
(citations omitted). Also, both in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985), and in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court held a
statute to be an unauthorized exercise of the commerce power, not because it ex-
ceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause but because it infringed state sovereignty.
See infra notes 106-28 and 145-67 and accompanying text.
4. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(b)(1), 104
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sion of firearms within one thousand feet of a school. Lopez thus
breaks a long line of cases deferring to congressional action.
Historically, the Court has sustained federal regulation of civil
rights,5 loan-sharking, restoration of environmental damage,7
labor relations,' and home-grown wheat,' even where such ac-
tivities had tenuous links to interstate commerce. The Lopez
Court, although recognizing the great breadth accorded Congress
under such decisions, attempted to create special protection for
state sovereignty. ' This article will argue that Lopez does so by
implicitly combining two previously separate limitations on the
commerce power into a heightened scrutiny of federal legislation
regulating areas of traditional concern to the states.
As the first case since the New Deal nullifying congressional
action as beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause, Lopez inevi-
tably will play an important role in the Court's continuing defi-
nition of federalism, the distribution of powers between the
federal and state governments." The Court has historically
Stat. 4844-45 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The statute
provided a number of exceptions, excluding gun possession on private property not
on school grounds, § 922(q)(2)(B)(i); individuals employed by the school, §
922(q)(2)(B)(v), or licensed to carry a firearm, § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii); participants in school
programs, § 922(q)(2)(B)(iv); law enforcement officers, § 922(q)(2)(B)(vi); and hunters
permitted to cross school property, § 922(q)(2)(B)(vii). The statute also provided that
it did not preempt state or local governments from establishing gun-free school
zones, § 922(q)(4). Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
5. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
6. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
7. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
8. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
11. This article focusses on the Commerce Clause as a limit on federal legisla-
tive power;, the Clause also acts as a limit on state power, by giving the federal
government the primary power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Martin H.
Redish & Shane v. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569; Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994). The allocation of powers between feder-
al and state courts also raise issues of federalism. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts should abstain from hearing claims that
are already at issue in a pending state criminal proceeding); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947) (holding that state courts may not refuse to hear federal claims); Naomi
R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IowA L. REv. 1073
(1994); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992); Margaret G. Stewart, Federalism
and Supremacy: Control of State Judicial Decision-Making, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 431
(1992). Federalism also protects individual rights by setting the federal and state
governments as checks on each other's actions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five
Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994) (pro-
posing expansion of states' roles in protecting individual rights); Akhil Reed Amar,
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struggled to define the limits on congressional power vis-a-vis
the states. 2 Shifting majorities of the Court have disagreed on
whether the Tenth Amendment imposes substantive or proce-
dural limits on the commerce power."3 The rhetoric of Lopez
clearly envisions substantive limits on the federal government's
power to legislate on local matters.14 Lopez purports to preserve
certain domains of activity for state regulation. The Gun-Free
School Zones Act was held to be an incursion on the states' po-
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); James F. Blumstein, Fed-
eralism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1251 (1994) (arguing that federalism protects minorities in the political pro-
cess). Such questions of local autonomy reach beyond the United States. See, e.g.,
George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Com-
munity and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Daniel A. Farber &
Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GAT's-Eye View of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
12. The differences among the Justices on the issue reflect a broader debate
about the nature of federalism, one of the core concepts of the constitutional scheme.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A
Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1357-60 (1994) (dis-
cussing political and historical theories of American Federalism, including WILLIAM
H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964), SAMUEL H. BEER,
To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993)), Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484
(1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)); Ed-
ward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 907 (1994) (enumerating justifications for federalism as stated
by Justice O'Connor, including competition among states, participation and experi-
mentation at a local level, division of power to enhance the political accountability of
each level of government, diffusion of power as a check on power, and furthering of
local communitarian interests). Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the
real significance of the federalism cases. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 907 (1994)
(questioning the value of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence as a norm of
governance); Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1994)
(characterizing federalism as a relatively ineffectual doctrine); Charles L. Black, Jr.,
On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 469 (1984) (characterizing
federalism jurisprudence as lacking overall coherence).
13. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See infra notes 106-44 and accompanying text, dis-
cussing, inter alia, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), over-
ruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (applying
a view of federalism based on substantive limits on federal power to regulate state
governmental activities) and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities and adhering to the view that pro-
tection of states from federal power is to be found in the national political process,
not in judicially imposed limits).
14. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
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lice power" and ability to conduct education.'6 Allowing the
statute to stand would have imperiled the "distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local." 7 This article
will conclude that such a dichotomy is likely to prove illusory,
that the doctrinal limits of Lopez will in practice be more modest
than its rhetoric suggests. The decision, however, may play an
important role in a rather different conception of federal-state
relations. Part I sets out the doctrinal development of the two
limits on the commerce power that come together in the Lopez
analysis. The first limit is the scope of the Commerce Clause it-
self. Modern case law has interpreted the provision very broadly,
upholding wide-ranging congressional regulation of activity with
indirect links to interstate commerce. The other limit is the
extrinsic limit imposed by the Tenth Amendment. Recent case
law has developed several Tenth Amendment doctrines that re-
strict the ability of Congress to regulate the operations of state
governments. Part II argues that under Lopez, the Tenth
Amendment limits on regulation of state governments have been
extended to cover regulation of private activity within areas of
traditional concern to the states. Part III analyzes the likely
effect of Lopez as a limit on federal legislative power. Lopez
seeks to bar federal regulation of the "truly local" aspects of such
areas as education and crime. But Congress will remain able to
legislate widely in such areas because of inevitable jurisdictional
links to commercial and economic activity. However, Congress
will be able to do so only by addressing heightened requirements
in the legislative process. Thus, although Lopez seeks to create
substantive limits protecting areas of state concern, its effect is
likely to be more consistent with the procedural conception of
federalism.
I. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LIMITS ON THE COMMERCE POWER
Lopez implicitly brings together two related sets of cases in-
terpreting the limits of Congress' commerce power. Section A of
this Part discusses the cases addressing the Commerce Clause
15. Id. Generally defined, the police power is a state's power:
[T]o place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons
for the protection of public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the
public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to limi-
tations of the federal and state constitutions, and especially to the require-
ment of due process.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
17. Id. at 1634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937)).
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itself, which grants Congress the power "to regulate Com-
merce... among the several States."18 During the first third of
this century, the Court nullified a number of federal statutes
with a narrow interpretation of the Clause. Since then, however,
the Court has construed the power much more broadly, consis-
tently finding a sufficient link to commerce to uphold legislation
directed at more general social problems. Section B discusses the
case law under the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the
states all powers not granted to Congress. 9 The Tenth Amend-
ment had been read simply as a grant of residuary power, grant-
ing the states whatever powers remained after determining
what fell within the federal powers. But the Court has recently
interpreted the Tenth Amendment as supplying affirmative limi-
tations on the powers of the federal government to regulate state
governments. As the next Part will discuss, Lopez implicitly
extends this approach by bringing Tenth Amendment concerns
into the analysis when the federal government regulates individ-
uals.
A. The Scope of the Commerce Power
Understanding the impact of Lopez on federal legislative pow-
er requires reexamining the cases applying the Commerce
Clause, because Lopez turns on distinctions not discovered in
previous cases. An early case still sets the terms for debate.2"
The phrase giving Congress the power "to regulate Com-
merce... among the several States"' provides several hooks
for a narrow construction. The power to "regulate" could be lim-
ited to something like setting shipping terms. "Commerce" could
be understood to cover only commodities transactions between
merchants. The qualifier "among the several States" could limit
the regulatory power of Congress to interstate shipments or
even to actual crossing of state boundaries." Gibbons v.
Ogden," however, yielded a broad interpretation on all counts.
In ruling that the power to regulate commerce included the
power to regulate shipping in the waters of New York State,
Chief Justice John Marshall established several points. The
18. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. See supra note 13 for the text of Tenth Amendment.
20. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
22. The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Lopez advocates a narrow
construction of the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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power to "regulate" was broad: "to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed."24 "This power, like all others vest-
ed in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution." 5 The Court also read "com-
merce" broadly, rejecting a definition limited to buying and sell-
ing commodities:
This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of
its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something
more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
Nor was the power limited to interstate activity: "Commerce
among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of
each State, but may be introduced into the interior.""
But the decision also recognized limits: the power would not
extend to commerce that was "completely internal" to a state and
that did not "extend to or affect other States."28 Such vague lim-
its are not easily applied. The key cases from that day to the
present have turned on how those limits should be defined.
Until the turn of the century, the Court had few occasions to
address how far the commerce power extended.29 Then, as Con-
gress became more active in regulation, the Court decided a num-
ber of cases which are hard to reconcile. Some cases upheld con-
gressional action in the expansive spirit of Gibbons. So under-
stood, Congress' power to regulate commerce went well beyond
regulating the manner in which commerce was conducted. The
Court sustained a number of statutes that used a link to inter-
state commerce as a method of controlling activity within the
states. Thus, the Court upheld statutes prohibiting the interstate
transportation of stolen cars,"0 of lottery tickets,"' of prosti-
24. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 189-90.
27. Id. at 194.
28. Id.
29. One such case is United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869), in
which the Court struck down a federal statute regulating the sale of unsafe lamp
oil, on the basis that the commerce power did not create a general federal police
power. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 43-44.
30. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
31. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see also Clark Distilling Co.
v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding regulation of interstate
transportation of liquor).
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tutes," and of impure food.3" The Court also construed the
power to regulate interstate commerce to extend to intrastate
activity that affected interstate commerce. Thus, the Shreveport
Rate Cases' upheld legislation authorizing rates for intrastate
rail shipments because such control was "essential or appropri-
ate" to regulation of interstate commerce."5 Swift & Co. v. Unit-
ed States3" sustained the application of the federal anti-trust
laws to a conspiracy among meat packers on the grounds that the
conspiracy affected the amount of shipments made, the market
prices of meat, and the shipping fees paid railroads. Swift re-
lied on a practical, rather than technical conception of interstate
commerce, i.e., whether an activity in actuality affects commerce,
rather than a technical distinction between commerce and non-
commerce.
3 8
Other cases during the same period, however, sought to limit
Congress with confined readings of the Commerce Clause. In
contrast to the sweeping language of Gibbons, these cases
hemmed in the commerce power with formalistic distinctions.
United States v. E. C. Knight Co.39 held that the federal anti-
trust laws could not reach a conspiracy among sugar manufactur-
ers because manufacturing was not commerce, on the theory that
the manufacture of a good precedes its shipment and thus its
entry into commerce." Similarly, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.41
held that the commerce power did not authorize the regulation of
bituminous coal production, on the basis that mining precedes
32. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
33. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
34. 234 U.S. 342 (1914); see also Southern R.R. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20
(1911) (sustaining federal regulation of intrastate railroad equipment).
35. The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351.
36. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
37. Swift, 196 U.S. at 397-98.
38. Id. at 398. In Justice Holmes' words, "commerce among the States is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."
Id. Subsequent cases relied on Swift for the proposition that the commerce power
authorized regulation protecting the "stream of commerce" from obstructions or bur-
dens. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 439 (1930);
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518-19 (1922) (sustaining regulation of stockyards).
39. 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898)
(holding that transactions at stockyards were local and therefore not interstate com-
merce within the scope of the Sherman Act).
40. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12. In the Court's well-known formulation,
"Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it." Id. In drawing these
distinctions, the Court frequently relied on its earlier decisions, under what is com-
monly referred to as the "dormant" Commerce Clause, addressing whether state stat-
utes impermissibly attempted to regulate commerce. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U.S. 1 (1888).
41. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
1995
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commerce. 2 The Court also struck down regulation of activity
that succeeded to commerce. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States' invalidated rules setting maximum hours and
minimum wages for slaughterhouse workers, who dealt with
livestock after it had been transported from state to state."
Schechter relied on another formalism when it held that the
effect of the regulated activity on meat prices was only an "in-
direct" effect on interstate commerce and therefore not within the
purview of Congress' commerce power.' Similarly, Railroad Re-
tirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.' ruled that requiring rail-
roads to establish pension plans was not an authorized exercise
of the commerce power because the social welfare of the worker
was too remote from commerce.
In other cases where interstate commerce was plainly part of
the activity at issue, the Court held that the statute regulated
not commerce but a non-commercial aspect of the activity. Thus,
Adair v. United States"8 invalidated a statute that barred rail-
roads from discharging workers for being members of a union, on
the basis that the statute regulated union membership, not inter-
state commerce. 4'9 The Court made another elusive distinction in
invalidating a statute making common carriers liable if their
negligence injured their employees, stating that the statute
impermissibly regulated the employees involved in commerce,
rather than regulating the business of interstate commerce."° In
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League,"1
Justice Holmes held professional baseball not to be interstate
commerce and thus not subject to the federal antitrust laws. 2
The necessary travel and transportation of equipment across
state lines were not commerce because they were merely incident
to the games, which in turn were not commerce because the
personal effort was not related to production."
Even where the statute governed interstate commerce, the
42. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 303-04; see also United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (holding that a strike at a coal mine was
not restraint of interstate commerce subject to the Sherman Act).
43. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
44. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548-49.
45. Id. at 546-47.
46. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
47. Alton, 295 U.S. at 362.
48. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
49. Adair, 208 U.S. at 179.
50. See The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
51. 259 U.S. 200 (1922)
52. Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
53. Id. at 209.
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Court might deem it to go beyond regulation. Hammer v.
Dagenhart5' limited the range of permissible "regulation." Con-
gress had banned transport in interstate commerce of goods
made in factories that violated child labor standards. 5 The
Court held that the power to regulate commerce did not permit
Congress to exclude goods from commerce. 6 The Court distin-
guished the cases involving interstate transportation of impure
food and lottery tickets on the basis that those involved the ex-
clusion from commerce of goods having harmful qualities, where-
as products of child labor were not inherently harmful. 7 Rather
than excluding harmful goods from interstate commerce, the
statute impermissibly regulated a local evil that had not extend-
ed into interstate commerce.58
At the same time as the Court regularly used the Commerce
Clause and other constitutional doctrines to nullify federal stat-
utes, the New Deal greatly widened the scope of federal legisla-
tion." Perhaps due to the political pressure to let social legisla-
tion stand"0 (most notably, President Franklin Roosevelt's sto-
ried attempt to increase the size of the Court to permit ap-
pointment of more congenial Justices), the Court's application of
the Commerce Clause took a sharply different tack with NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,s in which steel manufacturers
54. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
55. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268.
56. Id. at 273-74.
57. Id. at 271-72.
58. Id. at 276.
59. For a broader political theory explaining the Court's Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence, see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 12 (arguing that because the Su-
preme Court is politically vulnerable to Congress and the President, it has only
limited congressional authority in exceptional and temporary periods when members
of the Court had distinct ideological differences with other branches). See also Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Foreword:
Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (discussing more generally such
strategic behavior by the Court).
60. The received view is that the Court's dramatic shift in approach was a
straightforward concession to the national mood, but the view has been challenged.
See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201 (1994)
(arguing that the shift in decisions reflected early New Deal statutes' poor drafting
and lack of attention to constitutional requirements); Richard D. Friedman, Switch-
ing Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994) (arguing that the Court's shift in
stance was more gradual than commonly described); Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told
Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994) (describing how Justice Felix
Frankfurter may have rendered the history of the New Deal Court unclear in his
efforts to present the Court favorably).
61. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Although Jones & Laughlin is conventionally considered
the first case of the era of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a close read-
1995
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challenged the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.62 The stat-
ute granted employees the right to form unions, imposed duties
to engage in collective bargaining, and created the National La-
bor Relations Board, with power to act against "unfair labor prac-
tice[s]... affecting commerce. '" A narrow majority of the Court
declined to apply the manufacturing/commerce distinction of E.C.
Knight and Carter Coal or to rule that the effect on commerce
was merely indirect. Rather, the Court held regulation of labor
relations to be within Congress' broad powers to protect inter-
state commerce from burdens and obstructions, regardless of the
source.
64
In the following decades, an unbroken series of cases continued
to uphold a broad conception of the commerce power. The Court
repudiated the limiting distinctions of its restrictive holdings
and, over time, adopted three alternative bases for justifying
legislation. The commerce power covered three broad categories:
regulating the use of channels of interstate commerce;"5 protect-
ing goods or people in commerce and the instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce; 66 and regulating activities affecting com-
merce.67 In applying each category, the Court explicitly rejected
the restrictive distinctions of earlier cases. Accordingly, the pow-
er to regulate the use of the channels of commerce was not limit-
ed to regulation directed at commerce itself. United States v.
Darby' upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which prohibited
interstate shipment of goods if minimum wage and maximum
hour standards were violated respecting anyone employed in
their production.69 Darby held that Congress had the power to
exclude any article from interstate commerce, explicitly overrul-
ing Hammer v. Dagenhart," which had struck down the ban on
interstate shipment of the products of child labor.7 An even
ing of the cases may show it more consistent with the earlier cases than commonly
thought. See Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Com-
merce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1992)
(arguing that Jones & Laughlin was still consistent with a restrictive view of earlier
cases and that only after the composition of the Court changed did the Court adopt
a much more expansive approach in subsequent cases).
62. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22.
63. Id. at 22-24, 30.
64. Id. at 36-37.
65. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
66. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
67. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
68. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
69. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
70. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
71. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-16.
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broader alternative holding in Darby was that Congress could
regulate intrastate labor conditions in order to prevent the
spread of substandard wages.72 If intrastate producers were not
subject to regulation, they could reduce costs by paying less than
a minimum wage and thereby gain a competitive advantage
against other goods sold in interstate commerce.7" Under such a
view, Congress could regulate intrastate activities to prevent
them from spreading a perceived problem through interstate
commerce.
The second category, the power to protect the instrumentalities
of commerce and persons in commerce, also supported legislation
directed at social ills much broader than commerce. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination by hotels and
restaurants whose operations affected commerce, broadly de-
fined.74 In upholding the statute, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States75 noted testimony before congressional committees
that racial discrimination made it more difficult and sometimes
impossible for some travellers to find accommodations. 7' Nota-
bly, the Court held that it made no difference whether the travel
was commercial or was by private automobile.77 The Court also
upheld application of the statute even to motels of a purely local
character." If the motel served travellers, then it could be regu-
lated in order to protect interstate commerce from racial discrimi-
nation." Likewise, Katzenbach v. McClung"0 upheld application
of the statute to any restaurant if it served interstate travellers
or if a substantial portion of the food it served had moved in com-
merce."1 Accordingly, the commerce power authorized regulation
of a local restaurant with no interstate travellers as customers,
where it purchased 46% of its food from a supplier who had pro-
cured it from out of state.82 Thus the power to protect the
movement of products in commerce was also drawn very broadly.
The last category, activities affecting commerce, provided an
even wider scope for congressional regulation, as the Court con-
72. Id. at 122-23.
73. Id.
74. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-207, 78 Stat. 241,
243-46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
75. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
76. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id. at 258.
79. Id.
80. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
81. Id. at 298, 302-04.
82. Id. at 296-97.
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sistently found sufficient links to commerce to uphold legislation.
Purely intrastate activity was subject to regulation if it had ef-
fects on interstate commerce." The effects were sufficient if they
went to the terms on which commerce was conducted, such as the
price of goods." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. 85 up-
held the application of price regulations to milk even when pro-
duced and sold intrastate, holding that Congress could regulate
intrastate transactions in order to effectively regulate interstate
prices.8 6 Wickard v. Filburn8 7 upheld congressional authority to
regulate production of goods that never reached interstate com-
merce, or even intrastate commerce. 8 Wickard sustained the ap-
plication of production quotas to a small farmer's wheat that was
not sold but rather used for home consumption, fed to his live-
stock or kept for the next year's sowing. 9 The Court held dis-
tinctions between production and commerce or between direct
and indirect effects on commerce to be irrelevant." Home-grown
wheat affected the overall demand for wheat and therefore affect-
ed the market price of wheat.9 ' A farmer that used home-grown
wheat would not need to purchase such wheat on the market.92
In order to control the market price of wheat, Congress could reg-
ulate production of wheat that never left the farm, let alone
moved in interstate commerce.9"
In addition, the Court accorded great deference to Congress in
deciding whether an activity affected commerce, requiring only
that Congress have "a rational basis for finding a chosen regula-
tory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce."94 Accord-
ingly, the Court sustained statutes with attenuated links to in-
terstate commerce. Maryland v. Wirtz95 upheld the expansion of
the federal minimum wage and maximum hour statute to cover
not just employees engaged in commerce or in production of
goods for commerce, but also all employees of an enterprise that
83. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942).
84. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121.
85. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
86. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121.
87. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
88. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
89. Id. at 127.
90. Id. at 120, 124-25.
91. Id. at 127.
92. Id. at 128.
93. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
94. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
95. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
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had any employees engaged in interstate commerce.9" An em-
ployer could reduce overall costs by paying substandard wages to
employees who were not involved in production for interstate
commerce, which would affect the prices at which the employer
sold products in interstate commerce.97 In order to compete,
companies in other states might have to pay their employees sub-
standard wages. Perez v. United States99 sustained a federal
conviction for loansharking, where the defendant had made a
loan to a butcher and used threats of violence to extract usurious
interest."' Even if the particular transaction did not affect in-
terstate commerce, it was sufficient that such activity in general
affected commerce by funding organized crime and permitting it
to take over legitimate businesses. 1' Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc."° sustained federal regula-
tion of various environmental aspects of surface mining, includ-
ing restoration of land and vegetation, preservation of topsoil,
and disposition of waste. 3 The Court looked to both the ad-
verse economic effects from environmental damage and to the
possibility that interstate competition between mining companies
created incentives to reduce costs by not remedying environmen-
tal damage.'
Such decisions left no doubt that the commerce power was
extremely broad.' 5 But, on the basis of the case law, it was
very difficult to state where the outer limits lay. There were a
number of cases providing examples of legislation that fell within
the power, but now there existed not a single example of a stat-
ute that definitively exceeded the power. None of the earlier
cases invalidating statutes provided a reliable benchmark for
when congressional action would exceed the commerce power, for
each case either had been explicitly overruled or was very ques-
tionable authority in light of later case law. So at the time that
Lopez came before the Court, it was unclear how close a connec-
tion to interstate commerce was required to sustain legislation.
96. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 190-91.
97. Id. at 192.
98. Id.
99. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
100. Perez, 402 U.S. at 147-48.
101. Id. at 153-56.
102. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
103. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277-82.
104. Id. at 281-82.
105. See James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Consti-
tutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1795, 1796 (1994) (citing commentators questioning whether there were any
real limits left to the commerce power).
1995
Duquesne Law Review
Section B will argue that, in redefining the analysis of that issue,
Lopez was strongly influenced by a different type of limit on the
commerce power, the Tenth Amendment cases.
B. Tenth Amendment Limitations on the Commerce Power
The second set of cases that converge in Lopez address limits
on the commerce power stemming from the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of power to the states. Such cases limit congressional
power not because the regulated activity does not affect inter-
state commerce, but rather because Congress' action infringes on
state sovereignty. In recent times, the Court has applied three
related doctrines to protect the operations of the states from reg-
ulation under the commerce power. Under the holding of Nation-
al League of Cities v. Usery'° (which has been overruled but re-
tains vigorous support by some Justices on the Court), federal
regulation could not infringe the states' freedom to structure
integral governmental operations."7 Under New York v. United
States,' Congress may not require state legislatures and ad-
ministrations to participate in federal regulatory schemes.'
Under the clear statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft,"' the
Court will avoid applying federal regulatory statutes to state
governments unless the statute unmistakably applies."1 Al-
though these doctrines apply only to federal statutes regulating
state governments, Part II will discuss how they strongly influ-
ence the Lopez analysis of congressional power to regulate the
activity of individuals.
The first of the three doctrines has a tangled history. The
Court has consistently recognized that the Constitution protects
state sovereignty from federal incursions. But the Court's defini-
tion of the nature of such protection has changed dramatically.
Wirtz sustained application of minimum wage and maximum
hour regulations of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state-run
schools and hospitals." The Court rejected the argument that
such control infringed state sovereignty protected by the Tenth
106. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
107. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
108. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
109. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188.
110. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
111. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
112. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198-99. The case also held that such regulation was
within the scope of the commerce power. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
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Amendment."' If general regulations were within the com-
merce power, the Court held that it made no difference if a state
was among the regulated entities."' The federal statute would
apply even to what might be considered core governmental func-
tions, as well as proprietary activities in which the state resem-
bled other employers."5 Fry v. United States"" followed Wirtz
in upholding the application to state employees of federal limits
on salary increases under the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970."' But the Court no longer dismissed the proposition that
state governments might be less subject to federal regulation
than other entities."' The Court stated that the Tenth Amend-
ment would prevent congressional action that damaged the ca-
pacity of a state government to operate."' Controls on wages,
however, were not sufficiently invasive to invalidate the regula-
tion.2  Justice Rehnquist dissented, voicing concerns that
would reappear in a different rubric in Lopez. In his view, the
controls violated affirmative limits on the ability of Congress to
regulate traditional governmental activities of the states, such as
operating schools and hospitals.''
A narrow majority of the Court adopted Justice Rehnquist's
view in National League of Cities v. Usery. 2' Overruling
Wirtz,' the Court struck down the application of federal mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions to state employees.'
The opinion drew an analogy between individual rights and the
rights of states." Just as a federal statute within the com-
merce power would be invalid if it violated an individual's right
113. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198-99.
114. Id. at 196-97.
115. Id. at 195-96; see also Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Govern-
mental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA_ L. REV. 1073 (1980)
(criticizing the distinction).
116. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
117. Fry, 421 U.S. at 548.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 547 n.7. Under the Tenth Amendment, "Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
effectively in a federal system." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 557-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
123. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855. The Court did not overrule but
rather distinguished Fry, stating that the temporary wage freeze in Fry did not dis-
place state choices about how to structure operations but only temporarily
maintained choices already made. Id. at 853.
124. Id. at 844 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869)).
125. Id. at 841.
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to a fair trial or to due process, a federal statute regulating com-
merce could not "displace the States' freedom to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions."' Regulation of state employees was held to be such an
infringement.' The power to set the wages and hours of state
employees in governmental functions was essential to the states'
"separate and independent existence" and therefore beyond the
power of Congress.'28
But after several decisions struggling with the application of
its doctrine," 9 National League of Cities was overruled by Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.. Like Na-
tional League of Cities, Garcia was a five to four decision, a
change of position by Justice Blackmun tipping the scales. Garcia
recognized that application of the vague protections afforded to
the states had been difficult.'' The rule of National League of
Cities, which protected "traditional" and "integral" state govern-
mental functions, had proved "unsound in principle and unwork-
able in practice."' 2 Lower court decisions exhibited considerable
confusion. Courts had held that licensing automobile drivers and
operating an airport were integral governmental functions, but
regulating road traffic and regulating air transportation were
126. Id. at 841, 852. The Court's understanding of state sovereignty was some-
what vague. See Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations
of 'Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977)
(arguing that National League of Cities relies on an inherently contradictory vision
of state sovereignty).
127. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
128. Id. at 845-46, 851-52 (citations omitted). The case law support for the
decision was sparse. The primary authority relied upon by the Court was Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), which held that the federal government could not
require Oklahoma to move the location of its state capital as a condition for becom-
ing a state. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845 (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma,
221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)). The Coyle holding lends support to the general proposi-
tion that states have protected aspects of sovereignty, but hardly compels as broad a
protection as National League of Cities announced. Cf. United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936) (upholding the application of statutes setting railroad safety,
labor relations, and employer liability requirements for railroad companies owned by
state governments).
129. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264 (1981); Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 5-22 (describing how subsequent decisions narrowed the application
of National League of Cities before it was finally overruled by Garcia).
130. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For an approving analysis of Garcia, see Martha A.
Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Mis.
guided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84, 110-18 (1985) and Mark Tushnet, Why the
Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1994).
131. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
132. Id. at 546-47.
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not, drawing apparently arbitrary distinctions.' In addition,
providing special protection for "traditional" and "integral" func-
tions actually undercut an important rationale for federalism.
One purpose of vesting states with governmental powers is to
permit them to experiment with various approaches in whatever
areas the state and its people choose.' " There is no reason to
give less protection to a state activity simply because it is of
recent origin."
But the main reason for the change in doctrine was that Gar-
cia stands for a different conception of federalism than National
League of Cities. Rather than relying on substantive limits on
congressional power devised by the courts, Garcia relied primari-
ly on the political processes inherent in the structure of federal
and state government.' Garcia recognized that the federal
structure of the Constitution required protection of state sover-
eignty."7 But sufficient protection was to be found not in sub-
stantive limits but rather in the procedural safeguards in the
constitutional structure, such as the limited powers granted to
Congress, the representation of the states in Congress and their
role in selecting the members of the federal government. 1"
These provided more effective means for the states to control the
federal government than judicial attempts to strike a bal-
ance. "  The Court left open the possibility that a failure in
those procedural safeguards could warrant judicial invalidation of
a congressional action."4 Conceivably, a state could have been
denied participation in the political process or somehow made
isolated or powerless.'" But absent such a showing, federal ac-
133. Id. at 538-39.
134. Id. at 545-46. One may question how much local governments will test
social policy by experimenting. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelec-
tion: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (arguing
that economic incentives weigh against local politicians experimenting with social
policies); Fernando R. LaGuarda, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health
Care Reform., 82 GEO. L.J. 159 (1993).
135. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
136. Id. at 550-53.
137. Id. at 547-50.
138. Id. at 550-53. "State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected
by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by
judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552. The classic statement of
this view is Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543 (1954). See also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis
the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
139. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-53 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 332, and
No. 62, at 408 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961)).
140. Id. at 556.
141. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (discussing Garcia).
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tion under the Commerce Clause would not be invalidated simply
because of its substantive effect on a state. Thus Garcia appeared
to consign the implementation of federalism to the political pro-
cess rather than judicial review."' Forceful dissents by Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist, however, predicted that future deci-
sions would in turn overrule Garcia, reinstating the doctrine of
National League of Cities.'" Subsequent Supreme Court opin-
ions have echoed those sentiments.1"
The Court indeed recently adopted a second Tenth Amendment
doctrine 1" that, although narrower in scope, represents a re-
turn to application of substantive limits on Congress, rather than
reliance on political processes. New York v. United States nulli-
fied parts of a federal scheme for regulating waste disposal on
the basis that the statute "commandeered" state legislatures by
requiring them to enact statutes according to congressional direc-
tion.'" The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 198547 made states responsible for regulating disposal of
low-level radioactive waste.'" The Act set deadlines for each
state to ratify legislation either joining a regional compact with
142. Thus, it appeared at the time that National League of Cities may only
have been a temporary break in the usual reluctance of the courts to limit the fed-
eral legislative power. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985) (criticizing Garcia as failing to fulfill responsibilities of
judicial review of legislative action); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Pro-
cess: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341.
143. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581, 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Another possible
limit on the commerce power that was rejected by a narrow majority of the Court
but may gain a majority under the present composition of the Court was the subject
of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which held that federal legisla-
tion pursuant to the Commerce Clause may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 22. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 12, at 1394 (discussing how changing membership of the Court could affect
continuing authority of Union Gas).
144. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (majority opinion
by Justice O'Connor noting that the case did not present an occasion to apply or
revisit the holding of Garcia); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 531 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (reaffirming statement from Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Garcia that the Court should enforce federalism through judicial review).
145. Both National League of Cities and New York v. United States are fairly
regarded as Tenth Amendment cases, although neither purported to rest their hold-
ings on the actual words of the Tenth Amendment.
146. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 176. For commentary on the de-
cision, see William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Restriction on
Congressional Power vis-a-vis the States?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (1994) and Wayne 0.
Hanewicz, New York v. United States: The Court Sounds a Return to the Battle
Scene, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1605 (1993).
147. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-
240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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other states or developing disposal facilities within the state. 49
A state that failed to meet deadlines would: (i) not receive a
share of certain fees collected at disposal sites; (ii) not be permit-
ted access to certain disposal sites; and (iii) be required to take
title to and possession of waste generated in that state."'5 There
was no dispute that regulation of low-level radioactive waste dis-
posal is within the commerce power, because of the interstate
market for such disposal.'' But New York v. United States held
that Congress could not exercise that power in a way that re-
quired state legislatures to play a prescribed role.'
The Court reached this result by way of a new understanding
of the Tenth Amendment."5' Under the Tenth Amendment, the
149. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 151-52.
150. Id. at 152-53.
151. Id. at 159-60.
152. Id. at 166 (holding that the Commerce Clause "authorizes Congress to reg-
ulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."). The Court rested on the basic idea
that the Constitution "looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States." Id. at 162 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868), over-
ruled by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885)). Notably, it did not rest on
another possible constitutional basis, the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4,
under which states are guaranteed a republican form of government. See Deborah J.
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century,
88 CoLum. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause protects state gov-
ernment autonomy from required participation in federal regulation). Rather, the
Court relied primarily on two earlier cases that had sustained congressional action
while noting that Congress had not required the states to adopt specific regulations.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161-62 (discussing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982)). Neither case held that such a requirement would necessarily be invalid,
so New York v. United States was breaking new ground. The sparse case law sup-
port may receive little assistance from the historical record. See Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing on
the basis of historical sources that New York v. United States is not consistent with
the historical intent of the Framers of the Constitution); Martin H. Radish, Doing It
with Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal
Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994) (arguing
that New York v. United States was wrongly decided and that the Court's precedents
do not impose a state sovereignty limitation on the federal commerce power); see
also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Comman-
deer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLuM. L. REV. 1001 (1995) (criti-
cizing New York v. United States as taking a simplistic approach to the complex
issue of state autonomy).
153. For an argument that the result in New York v. United States may have
been correct but that the opinion's use of authority is misleading, see Richard E.
Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent,
History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN. L. REV. 493
(1993). On the same theme, see James W. Ducayet, Publius and Federalism: On the
Use and Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
821 (1993). The decision has also been characterized as justifiable on prudential
grounds but doctrinally questionable. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
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powers that are not delegated to the federal government are "re-
served to the States. " i One can infer from this that not all
governmental powers are granted to the federal government, for
that would leave nothing for the states.155 Thus, congressional
action must have a basis in one of its enumerated powers, not
just the general power of a sovereign government.5 5 New York
v. United States took the inference one step further, stating that
one could determine the extent of federal power by first deter-
mining the extent of state power.8 7 The Court characterized
the Tenth Amendment as a tautology: all powers not delegated to
the federal government are reserved to the states; therefore, a
power reserved to the states was not delegated to the federal gov-
ernment."8 The Court reasoned that if a power should belong
to the states, then it must not have been delegated to the federal
government.' As a matter of mere logic, such reasoning is spe-
cious,"'0 but it sufficed for the Court to reconcile its analysis
with previous cases characterizing the Tenth Amendment as a
mere truism.' 1
Using the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on the commerce
power, the Court held that the power to regulate interstate com-
merce did not give Congress power to direct state regulation.
6 2
The first two incentives of the statute were valid exercises of the
power because they did not mandate state action."e They of-
fered money and access to waste disposal sites to states that
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993).
154. U.S. CONST. amend X.
155. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1833)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 157.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. An analogy to a residuary clause in a will might illustrate how strained
such reasoning is. A public-spirited decedent might have left her estate to the feder-
al and state governments. "I leave my personal effects to the federal government;
everything else I leave to the state." In order to determine what the state gets, it
would seem necessary to first decide what constituted her personal effects. For ex-
ample, to decide who would get her books, one would first decide whether the
phrase 'personal effects" covered books. Reading the clause the way that New York
v. United States reads the Tenth Amendment, one could first decide whether the
books should go to the state; if so, then they were not personal effects that went to
the federal government.
161. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (characterizing the Tenth Amendment as a truism
that contains no substantive limits)). As recently as 1988, the Court had stated that
the Tenth Amendment provided no substantive limits on federal powers. See South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988).
162. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
163. Id. at 173-74.
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chose to enact legislation, but left the states free to choose not to
act.' But the third incentive impermissibly forced states either
to enact legislation according to the instructions of Congress or
take title to waste.' Congress could not so commandeer state
governments into service as federal regulators.'" Accordingly,
the provision was unconstitutional.'67
A third check on congressional action that affects states is the
"clear statement rule," as applied with particular force in Gregory
v. Ashcroft. '" A number of cases have interpreted federal stat-
utes not to interfere with state interests absent a clear statement
in the statute itself. 9 Thus, the Court has read ambiguous
statutes not to regulate criminal activity within the police power
of the states,"0 to pre-empt state regulation in an area of com-
merce,171 or to make states liable to individuals under federal
laws. 72 Gregory v. Ashcroft formulated a particularly demand-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 174-77. New York v. United States could have served as a vehicle
for reconsidering Garcia. A statute that commandeers state legislatures would seem
to threaten states' ability to structure integral operations and the states' independent
sovereignty. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841, 845-46, 852. But Justice
O'Connor's opinion distinguished that line of cases as applicable only to general
statutes regulating both states and private parties. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. at 160. The opinion made no effort to explain why concerns of state sovereignty
were any different in the present case, or indeed whether scrutiny of federal action
would be any different at all. Justice O'Connor also carefully did not acknowledge
Garcia as sound authority, stating simply that "this case presents no occasion to
apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases." Id. So for the present, the possi-
ble return of National League of Cities is left for a future Court.
166. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 176. This view was anticipated in
Joseph Lipner, Imposing Federal Business on Officers of the States: What the Tenth
Amendment Might Mean, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907 (1989) (arguing that the Tenth
Amendment shields inner workings of state governments from federal regulation).
167. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177. The Court stated that, con-
sistent with its view of the Tenth Amendment as a tautology, one could view the
provision as unconstitutional because it exceeded the enumerated powers of Congress
or because it infringed "upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment." Id.
168. 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (questioning whether clear statement rules are beneficial
because they protect constitutional structures by giving weight to underenforced
constitutional norms, or harmful because they reflect undemocratic judicial re-
strictions on legislative action); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Con-
gressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959 (1994) (arguing that clear
statement rules borrow from both the procedural and substantive conceptions of
federalism); Deanna L. Ruddock, Note, Gregory v. Ashcroft-" The Plain Statement
Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State Relations, 70 N.C.L. REV. 1563
(1992).
169. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 2608, 2617 (1992).
170. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5-6 at 316.
171. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
172. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (applying clear
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ing form of this approach. Missouri law required that appointed
state judges retire at age seventy."' The issue was whether
such mandatory retirement violated the Federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), 74 or fell within
the ADEA's exception for "an appointee on the policymaking lev-
el.""76 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion held the language of
the exception to be ambiguous.'76 Where congressional intent
was not clearly spelled out, a federal statute would not be read to
interfere with state decisions on the qualifications of judges.'77
Therefore, since Congress had not made it plain that state judges
were included, the Court held them to be excluded under the ex-
ception.' The holding went beyond previous clear statement
cases. First, previous cases had concerned whether Congress
intended a statute to apply to states at all. 7 ' The ADEA, how-
ever, explicitly included states as employers.' 0 Thus Gregory
extended the clear statement requirement to interpretation of not
only the scope of the statute, but also individual statutory provi-
sions. Secondly, it found ambiguity very readily. As the Court
itself stated, it requires an "odd" reading of the statute to exclude
judges as policymaking appointed officials, especially within the
context of the definition.' Nevertheless, the Court held that
Congress had failed to make it clear that judges were includ-
ed. '5 Gregory goes beyond a method for determining the mean-
ing of statutory language to an affirmative check on congressio-
nal action. If Congres s intends to take action pursuant to the
commerce power which interferes with the way a state exercises
its sovereign powers, then Congress must take pains to be very
statement rule in interpreting federal statute to determine whether Congress has
abrogated a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that states are not "persons"
liable for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Congress did not
make it clear that it intended states to be covered); see also Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (applying presumption against interpreting
federal statute granting money to states to be conditioned on state compliance with
federal regulation).
173. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455.
174. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
175. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)).
176. Id. at 467.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 476 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgement) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 437 U.S. 234 (1985)
and Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
180. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2)).
181. Id. at 467.
182. ld.
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clear about it.1'
Thus, at the time that Lopez came before the Court, congres-
sional action under the Commerce Clause could be subject to four
related limitations:
1. In order for Congress to regulate an activity under the Com-
merce Clause, the regulated activity had to affect commerce.
2. A generally applicable federal statute that impaired a state's
ability to structure integral operations in an area of traditional
governmental functions could be invalidated, if the National
League of Cities rule were revived by overruling Garcia.
3. A statute that required a state to participate in a federal regu-
latory scheme could be impermissible "commandeering" under
New York v. United States.
4. The Court would seek to interpret a federal statute to avoid
interference with a state's exercise of its sovereign powers.
The application of the first limitation was the issue in Lopez.
But the next Parts seek to demonstrate that all four affected the
Court's analysis and are likely to affect the ultimate effect of
Lopez on the allocation of power between the state and federal
governments.
II. THE LOPEZ OPINION: A DOCTRINAL HYBRID
The specific issue in Lopez was whether Congress had authori-
ty under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,'" which prohibited knowing possession of a
firearm on or within one thousand feet of school grounds, subject
to a number of exceptions."~ By a vote of five to four, the Court
held that the statute unconstitutionally exceeded the commerce
power.' The broader significance of the opinion is that for the
first time since it abandoned the formalistic distinctions of the
pre-New Deal era, the Court held that Congress had exceeded
the commerce power. The Court noted that the case law of the
modern era had consistently rejected Commerce Clause challeng-
es, ' 7 but emphasized that even while expanding congressional
power, these decisions had regularly contained dicta reaffirming
183. Requiring Congress to be specific thus works against the incentives of
legislatures to be vague in enacting statutes in order to avoid making difficult deci-
sions about changes in the federal-state balance. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a
Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979,
1006-07 (1993). The clear statement rule also may lead to a clearer interpretive re-
gime on the part of the Court.
184. See supra note 4.
185. Lopez, 115 U.S. at 1626.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1628.
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that limits to the commerce power remained.'88 The Court de-
clared that its decision represented the enforcement of bound-
aries between the powers of the federal and state governments,
in order to preserve "a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local."189 Such a distinction was intended to
prevent the federal government from impermissibly regulating
areas of traditional concern to the states. This Part critically
examines the analysis the Court followed in reaching the result.
The Lopez decision changes analysis of the commerce power in
several ways. Earlier decisions had framed the commerce power
analysis as a single issue, whether the regulated activity affected
interstate commerce.' The Lopez Court, however, split the
analysis into several steps.' 9 ' At each step, the Court narrowed
the scope of permissible regulation. In addition to taking a nar-
row approach to the existing doctrine, the Court appears to have
added specific protection from federal regulation for areas of
traditional concern to the states.
The initial step was to frame the applicable test for analyzing
the effect of the activity on interstate commerce. The Court noted
some equivocation in the language of earlier decisions as to
whether the activity must affect or substantially affect interstate
commerce.'92 The Court chose the more demanding standard,
holding "the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regu-
lated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce."'9 3
Even *meeting that higher standard, however, would not always
be sufficient, as the Court introduced considerations beyond the
188. Id. at 1628-29.
189. Id. at 1634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937)).
190. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981) ("The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular
exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively
narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity
affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding." (cita-
tions omitted)); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-52 (1971).
191. The steps are: (i) determining whether the regulated activity affects inter-
state commerce; (ii) determining whether or not the regulated activity is commer-
cial/economic; and (iii) determining whether the activity is one of traditional state
concern. See infra notes 192-224 and accompanying text.
192. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. As discussed above, previous decisions had es-
tablished three categories subject to regulation under the commerce power: i) the
use of the channels of interstate commerce; (ii) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (iii) activities affecting
commerce. Id. at 1629-30. The Lopez Court held with little discussion that the first
two categories were inapplicable to gun possession in school zones. id. at 1630. Ac-
cordingly, the issue was whether gun possession in a school zone had a sufficient
effect on interstate commerce to come within the commerce power of Congress. Id.
193. Id. at 1630.
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effect on interstate commerce." 4 Although broad language in
modern cases had stated that the power to regulate interstate
commerce included the power to regulate activities that affected
it, the Lopez court announced important qualifications.'95
The Court first introduced a distinction that made its scrutiny
of legislation more demanding. It read the modem cases to ex-
tend only to "economic" or "commercial" activity.' Under the
modern case law, intrastate activities with a sufficient effect on
interstate commerce to come within the commerce power had
included coal mining, extortionate credit transactions, restau-
rants using substantial interstate supplies, hotels, and the pro-
duction and consumption of home-grown wheat.'97 The Court
generalized a rule from these holdings: "Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
that activity will be sustained."'98 But the Court also relied
solely on these cases for the converse proposition: that legislation
regulating activity that was not "economic" or "commercial" may
not necessarily be upheld. In formulating this rule, the Court
relied only upon cases sustaining congressional action. It sur-
veyed a number of cases in which the Court had upheld an act of
Congress, and found a pattern that each case involved economic
activity. That conclusion certainly is not compelled by the cases
the Court cited. Every case had upheld the statute in question, so
the cases presented no distinction between permissible and im-
permissible legislation. Moreover, none of the cases had limited
its holding to economic activity. The reasoning would be more
compelling if the Court had relied on a single case holding that
Congress had exceeded the commerce power and if that case had
involved non-economic activity. But all of the cases striking stat-
utes down are now of dubious authority, each having been explic-
itly rejected or eclipsed by subsequent cases.'99 So the only firm
conclusion compelled by the case law was that the commerce
power is at least broad enough to sustain the regulation at issue
in those cases; by the same token, however, the fact that the
limits were undefined makes it legitimate for Lopez to draw a
distinction.
194. Id. at 1630-32.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1630.
197. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971),
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 59-104 and accompanying text.
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The limiting distinction chosen by the Court, that the existing
Commerce Clause cases apply only to regulation of commercial
and economic activity, owes more to the Court's objective of de-
limiting spheres of national and local power than to an attempt
to maintain the existing analytical framework. The basis for
upholding broad congressional regulation in each of the existing
Commerce Clause cases had been that the regulated activity
could affect interstate commerce. Interstate commerce can be
affected by intrastate commercial activity and by intrastate non-
commercial activity, so if the effect on interstate commerce were
really the only issue, the distinction between intrastate commer-
cial and non-commercial activity would be untenable. Under the
analysis of the modern Commerce Clause cases prior to Lopez,
intrastate commerce is within the commerce power because it
affects interstate commerce, not because it is commerce. But
because the cases to date have all involved activity that could be
characterized as commercial or economic, the Lopez Court was
able to draw that distinction without upsetting settled precedent.
Presumably, the Court included as within the sweep of the prece-
dent not just commercial but more broadly economic activity in
order to accommodate the holding in Wickard v. Filburn,2°
which upheld regulation of home-grown wheat. Wickard involved
no commercial transaction; the farmer grew the wheat for his
family's consumption and for use on the farm.2' So either com-
mercial or more generally economic activity will still be broadly
subject to federal regulation even under the distinction found by
Lopez.
The distinction may not prove to be a clear one. The Court
made no attempt to define what it meant by "economic" and
"commercial," as though the terms needed no further definition.
Rather, in a subtle shift, the Court concluded without discussion
that gun possession is not an economic activity, as it understood
the term, or indeed as anyone could understand the term: "Sec-
tion 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms."2 2 But of course one
200. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
201. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
202. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. The Court also noted that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act did not include either of two means that might keep legislation
within the scope of the Commerce Clause: a jurisdictional element requiring a nexus
to commerce or legislative findings that guns in school zones affected interstate
commerce. Id. at 1631. Congress amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act to include
findings of a link to interstate commerce while the Lopez case was pending. Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, § 320904, 108
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could define those terms broadly enough to include gun posses-
sion. Indeed, the Court's opinion itself proves this, with the con-
tradictory assertion that under the dissent of Justice Breyer,
"any activity can be looked upon as commercial."" 3 Similarly,
"economic activity" is understood by some broadly enough to in-
clude the decision whether to carry a gun. Economics is much
broader than the study of markets and commerce. A leading
treatise on the economic analysis of law defines economics as the
study of "rational choice in a world-our world-in which re-
sources are limited in relation to human wants."", Much litera-
ture analyzes criminal law in economic terms, as a system of
incentives to affect behavior."'6 Likewise, education is an eco-
nomic activity, in the sense that it involves investment of time
and resources in the accumulation of knowledge and skills for
future use in work and other activities." 6 The Court evidently
used the term in a narrower sense, leaving it for future cases to
distinguish between economic and non-economic activity. Al-
though the Court's distinction may lack analytical rigor, it has
appeal on prudential grounds. In effect, the Court has abandoned
the somewhat strained analysis of earlier cases finding links
between intrastate commercial or economic activity and inter-
state commerce, apparently conceding that such links can gen-
erally be found. But the remainder of the opinion apparently
shifts to imposing additional limits on regulation of non-commer-
cial, non-economic activity beyond the question of effects on inter-
state commerce.
The Court may have framed the issue as whether firearm
possession in a school zone substantially affects interstate com-
merce,0 7 but its actual analysis was rooted in concerns of feder-
alism. Its analysis of the issue departs from the recent cases in
two ways. First, the Court appeared to reduce-the deference it
had previously accorded congressional action. The opinion had
earlier recognized that previous cases had applied a low-level of
scrutiny, "whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a
regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce. " "
Stat. 2125 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)). The Government did not rely on
those findings to apply retroactively and the Court did not consider them. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4.
203. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
204. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (4th ed. 1992) (citing
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)).
205. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 204, at 217-49 (analyzing crime as economic
behavior and citing similar work).
206. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975).
207. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
208. Id. at 1629. See also, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
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But in discussing the possible links between gun possession and
commerce, the Court did not term the issue as whether Congress
had a rational basis for finding a sufficient link, but rather as
whether possession of a firearm in a school zone in fact substan-
tially affects interstate commerce."° Although not explicitly re-
jecting the "rational basis" precedents, the Court appears to have
abandoned its previous deference to Congress in favor of its own
independent assessment of the effect on commerce.
Second, in making its assessment, the Court departed from the
approach of recent cases in another way that makes it more diffi-
cult for a statute to pass muster. In its analysis of whether the
regulated activity had a substantial effect on commerce, the opin-
ion did not focus upon whether gun possession in a school zone
could affect interstate commerce. The Court recognized several
strong arguments that such an effect could exist: guns in school
zones could increase violent crime, which in turn could increase
the costs of insurance, which are spread through the country;
people might avoid travel to areas they regard as unsafe; guns in
schools could adversely affect education, resulting in a less pro-
ductive work force. 10 The Lopez Court, however, never directly
addressed the arguments that gun possession in school zones
could substantially affect interstate commerce."' Rather, it con-
sidered instead the implications of accepting those argu-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (citations omitted).
209. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32. Rational basis review plays an important
role in balancing judicial review with legislative democracy. Robert W. Bennett,
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67
CAL. L. REv. 1049, 1056-60 (1979) (discussing the role of rational basis review in
various areas of constitutional law).
210. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33. Justice Breyer's dissent demonstrates at
length the connection between education and the economy, citing a number of stud-
ies on the economic effects of education. Id. at 1657-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. To refute such arguments convincingly, one would have to show that such
effects were not sufficient under the case law. This would require distinguishing the
facts of cases that found a sufficient link to commerce. Under the analysis of previ-
ous cases, such a showing would be difficult. In every case since 1937, the Court
has considered whether the regulated activity affected commerce and has each time
held it did, often relying on links to commerce similar to the foregoing, or even
more indirect. Thus, previous cases found sufficient effect on interstate commerce
where mining caused environmental damage that diminished the value of land,
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277-82, where extortion permitted criminal syndicates to raise
funds and to take control of businesses, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971),
and where a farmer grew his own wheat at home, therefore making it unnecessary
to buy from others, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Gun possession in
schools can affect education, which undoubtedly has economic effects on salaries and
productivity, and can affect the market for guns and whether they flow from state
to state. To literally apply the test-whether there was a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce-would require distinguishing those cases.
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ments." The Court reasoned that holding the Gun-Free School
Zones Act constitutional would leave no area to exclusive state
regulation.213 Accepting the "costs of crime" argument, in the
Court's view, would mean that Congress could regulate all vio-
lent crime and even any activity that could lead to violent
crime.2"' The Court foresaw an even greater slippery slope with
the education argument. If Congress could regulate education
because it affected national productivity, it could regulate mar-
riage, divorce, and child custody under the Commerce Clause.21
Likewise, if Congress could regulate gun possession because it
adversely affects education, then it could regulate the educational
process directly.21 Accordingly, Congress could require that all
schools follow a federally mandated curriculum." 7 In short, the
Court did not conclude that gun possession could not have a
substantial effect on commerce, although it had phrased the issue
in those terms. Rather, it concluded that it would be bad policy to
reach such a conclusion, because it would open the door to com-
plete federal regulation of two areas traditionally regulated by
the states-crime and education.
Thus, in deciding whether the activity has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, the Court considered whether that activ-
ity was one traditionally regulated by the states.21 The two is-
sues would appear to be separate. An activity that states com-
monly regulate may very well have an effect on interstate com-
merce. Indeed, states have traditionally regulated areas at the
heart of interstate commerce. For example, the Uniform Commer-
cial Code has been enacted in every state and specifically con-
templates application to interstate commercial transactions.1 9
More broadly, traditional areas of state common law such as
212. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1632. One judge has calculated that federal statutes define over
three thousand crimes; since that calculation, Congress has added a significant num-
ber of offenses, including those of the 1994 Crime Bill. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many
and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 980 n.10 (1995); Roger J. Miner, Crime and
Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 681 (1992).
215. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
216. Id. at 1633.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1633-34. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
O'Connor, also emphasized the view that Congress was regulating a non-commercial
activity in a way that encroached on an area of "traditional state concern"--educa-
tion. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219. For a discussion of the role of uniform state laws in federalism, see
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process:
Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993).
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contracts and torts frequently cover interstate interactions and
inevitably have a considerable effect on interstate commerce. In-
deed, states have regulated commercial activity so much that
most Commerce Clause cases concern the validity not of federal
legislation but rather of state regulation of commerce."' Wheth-
er an activity is one traditionally regulated by the states does not
determine whether that activity has an effect on interstate com-
merce. However, the Court left no doubt that the question of
traditionally state-regulated activity was now part of determining
the extent of the federal commerce power. Accordingly, the prin-
cipal doctrinal effect of Lopez will likely be that state sovereignty
concerns move from a background policy concern in Commerce
Clause analysis to an explicit part of the test.
In combining the two questions (whether an activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce and whether the activi-
ty is one of traditional state concern), the Court implicitly ex-
tended the approach of New York v. United States. That case held
that in determining the extent of the federal commerce power, a
court must consider the extent of the powers reserved to the
states.22' Lopez extends that approach from questions of direct
regulation of state government to questions of regulation of any
area of traditional state concern. In so doing, Lopez may make
the state sovereignty test more difficult to apply. New York v.
United States, by its terms, is limited to federal statutory provi-
sions which mandate that state governments regulate in a cer-
tain manner. Such statutory provisions should be easily identi-
fied and, if history is any guide, rather infrequent.222 Under
Lopez, however, state sovereignty could be part of the Commerce
Clause analysis for any statute that touched on an area of tradi-
tional state concern-an extremely broad and vague domain.
States have traditionally concerned themselves with any number
of activities. Courts may find it as difficult to determine whether
an activity is within an area of traditional state concern as it was
to determine whether a state function qualified as traditional or
integral, the National League of Cities categories that Garcia
rejected as unworkable."' Lopez also sets a very low threshold
220. See TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 6-2 to 6-29 (discussing Commerce Clause scru-
tiny of state legislation under "dormant" Commerce Clause analysis, preemption, and
related doctrines).
221. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
222. The majority opinion in New York v. United States noted that "[tihe take
title provision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited which
offers a state government no option other than that of implementing legislation
enacted by Congress." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177.
223. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
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for finding interference with an area of traditional state concern.
The Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate education, but
rather regulated an activity that could affect education.224 Un-
der that broad an approach, most federal statutes will affect
some area of state concern.
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, Lopez marks a notable
change. Before Lopez, a broad reading of the case law would
suggest that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regu-
late any activity that Congress had a rational basis for conclud-
ing affected commerce. 25 The Lopez opinion is far from clear
about how it would apply in future cases, but a pragmatic assess-
ment suggests that the analysis will proceed along the following
lines: the Court will sustain regulation of an intrastate activity
only if the Court (not Congress) determines
(i) the activity is a commercial transaction or economic activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce; or
(ii) the regulation is a necessary part of a broader regulation of
commercial or economic activity;22 or
(iii) the activity is non-commercial and non-economic, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce and is not an area of
traditional concern to the states.
Thus, scrutiny of federal legislation may be more demanding.
However, this does not necessarily imply a limitation on the
extent of Congress' power, if avenues are available to satisfy such
review while enacting equally extensive regulation. If the inter-
pretation above reflects how the Lopez Court has framed the
analysis, special protection for areas of traditional state concern
exists only for activity that is neither commercial nor economic
224. Note also that even if Congress lacked power to regulate aspects of edu-
cation under the Commerce Clause, it nevertheless could affect the way a state
conducts education through its other powers, for example by giving funds for educa-
tion to the states with conditions attached. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987) (upholding grants to states conditioned on following regulatory conditions);
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 85; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Pre-
emption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
289 (1984); see also David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L. J. 1 (1994).
225. See supra notes 59-104 and accompanying text. Lopez leaves intact the
other two categories of permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause: regulat-
ing the use of channels of interstate commerce and protecting goods or people in
commerce and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Both before and after
Lopez, the commerce power is also subject to specific limits in other provisions of
the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights.
226. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 (holding that the prohibition of gun pos-
session near schools did not regulate commerce or economic enterprises and was not
"an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.").
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and is not regulated as part of a broader permissible regulation.
The next Part turns to whether this new doctrinal restriction will
result in a political limitation, and if so, the nature of that limi-
tation.
III. LOPEZ AS FEDERALISM
This Part turns to the place of Lopez in the federalism debate,
especially its relationship to the Court's Tenth Amendment cases.
In recent years, the members of the Court have differed sharply
on whether implementing federalism should be left to political
processes or be enforced by judicial review protecting substantive
limits on federal legislation.2 27 The rhetoric of the Lopez opinion
characterizes the opinion as creating a substantive limit on feder-
al regulation of areas of traditional concern to the states, such as
crime and education. But rather than creating a line over which
Congress cannot reach, it may prove merely to create a jurisdic-
tional requirement that Congress could meet with the necessary
political will. Lopez may bar blanket federal regulation of non-
commercial activity, but it leaves Congress with the power to
reach such activity through a number of possible links to com-
merce. But even if the case does not create effective substantive
protection of such areas, it may prove to contribute to the proce-
dural protections of federalism. In order for Congress to regulate
non-commercial activities, the legislation will require detailed
jurisdictional provisions. Thus, Congress must affirmatively ad-
dress concerns of federalism during the legislative process. Ironi-
cally, then, a case that draws so much from National League of
Cities (which attempted to create spheres of activity in which
states were free from federal regulation) may prove more consis-
tent with the approach of Garcia (which relied on political pro-
cesses to balance state and federal interests).
In considering the likely effect of Lopez, a threshold question is
whether the case represents the repudiation of the expansive
reading of the Commerce Clause in the modem era. Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion forthrightly invites such a retrench-
ment. Justice Thomas would construe "commerce" to cover not
commercial activities generally but only transactions in goods
and transportation for such purposes. 28 In addition, Congress
227. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 205-06 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority opinion incorrectly re-
turned to a substantive view rather than the procedural view found in Garcia).
228. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-44 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Richard A.
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1987) (ad-
vocating an extremely narrow understanding of the commerce power); Jacques
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could regulate only interstate commerce, not other activities
simply because they affect interstate commerce.2" Thus, the
commerce power would no longer authorize regulation of manu-
facturing or production, let alone non-commercial activities that
affected the markets for goods and services.23 This indeed
would represent a substantive limit on the power of Congress.
But none of the other opinions in Lopez appear even to consider
such radical surgery on the powers of the federal government.
The approach of the majority opinion, rather, is to trim exist-
ing Commerce Clause doctrine around the edges. As discussed
above, the case makes judicial review under the Commerce
Clause more demanding in several ways. It requires not just an
effect but a substantial effect on commerce; the Court evaluated
the effect independently rather than simply determining if there
was a rational basis for Congress to find such an effect; the exist-
ing cases were read to apply only to commercial or economic
activity; and even a substantial effect on commerce would not
sustain regulation of non-commercial, non-economic activity in an
area of traditional concern to the states."' But Lopez did not
suggest that any of the recent opinions were wrongly decided.
Rather, the Court went to considerable lengths to reconcile its
analysis with both the results and the reasoning of the earlier
cases. The Court characterized its decision not as a limit on those
decisions, but a refusal to proceed any further.2 ' While recog-
nizing that some of the recent decisions contained language
broad enough to support further expansion, the Court carefully
showed that those decisions consistently acknowledged limits on
the commerce power, cataloging language from the cases recog-
nizing that the commerce power must have meaningful bound-
aries.2" The majority opinion also devotes considerable effort to
fitting the cases within its formulation of the analysis. The
majority's detailed discussion of Wickard argues that the Lopez
analysis is consistent with the most far-reaching of the earlier
cases.2" The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor, is even more careful to cast the holding as
LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Corn-
merce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994) (arguing that commerce power
should extend only to areas of commerce where externalities prevent efficient state
regulation).
229. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644-45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 192-224 and accompanying text.
232. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
233. Id. at 1628-29.
234. Id. at 1630.
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consistent with existing case law.235 Add to that the fact that
four of the Justices dissented in favor of more deference to Con-
gress, and it becomes clear that, to the present members of the
Court, the modern cases continue as binding authority. The ques-
tion then becomes whether the Lopez analysis will prevent Con-
gress from regulating particular areas of activity.
Even though Lopez has announced a narrower doctrinal ap-
proach to the commerce power, that likely will not translate into
creation of areas of activity immune to regulation by Congress.
As discussed above, Lopez cast its holding as necessary to protect
local power in areas of traditional concern to the states. In the
Court's view, upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act would
have eroded the police power of the states and the states' control
of education.2" If Congress could outlaw gun possession, then it
could regulate any violent crime." 7 If Congress could prohibit
gun possession in school zones, it could regulate every aspect of
education, to the extent of ordering a particular federal curricu-
lum to be taught in the states' schools.2" These are both slip-
pery slope arguments, but of different types. The first goes to
how far Congress may displace state regulation of the activities
of citizens. The second goes to how far Congress may control how
the state conducts its own activities. The Lopez holding presents
a rather porous limit as to the first and an unnecessary one as to
the second.
Lopez will likely prove not to be a complete substantive protec-
tion of any police power of the states. Even though it formulates
a narrow version of the "effect on commerce" approach, the doc-
trine does not protect areas of activity from federal regulation.
The fact that the activity is an area of traditional state concern is
not a limit if the activity is economic or commercial, or is regulat-
ed as part of a larger regulation of commercial or economic activi-
ty. To use the activity at issue in Lopez as an example, the opin-
ion still leaves ample means for Congress to regulate gun pos-
session near schools. A federal statute could prohibit gun posses-
235. Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining in the majority opinion's
"necessary though limited holding"). In addition, even if Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor were inclined toward Justice Thomas' reading of the Commerce Clause as
an abstract matter, they have in other contexts expressed great reluctance to depart
from settled law in important constitutional questions. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 2791, 2814-16 (1992) (opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by Jus-
tices Kennedy and Souter, expressing the importance to the public legitimacy of the
Court of following stare decisis).
236. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
237. Id. at 1632.
238. Id. at 1633.
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sion in school zones with a jurisdictional element requiring a link
to interstate commerce." 9 One could use the Court's recent cas-
es to draft a clause with broad coverage. The statute might pro-
hibit possession of a firearm in a school zone, where: (i) the fire-
arm was or had been in interstate commerce or affected inter-
state commerce;m or (ii) the defendant had moved in interstate
commerce; 21 or (iii) possession of the firearm affected a person
moving in interstate commerce or engaging in a commercial
transaction;242 or (iv) the school acquired a substantial amount
of books or supplies in interstate commerce.2  In most cases,
one of the alternatives would be met. Perhaps in a given case a
court might hold one of the foregoing provisions to be overbroad,
but in general Congress clearly retains a great deal of power to
regulate gun possession in school zones. Thus, Lopez may prevent
Congress from general regulation of crime, but it does not reserve
meaningful areas of regulation to the states. Rather, it reserves
to the states only sporadic instances of crime. To measure this as
a protection of the police power of the states, one could imagine a
statute that, unlike the actual statute in Lopez, preempted state
regulation. The only police power reserved to the states in abso-
lute terms is the ability to regulate those instances where, by a
combination of circumstances, none of the jurisdictional alterna-
tive were met. Thus, Lopez reserves exclusive police power to the
states only over random, isolated instances of crime. The power
to regulate such activities hardly amounts to the right to govern
areas of traditional concern to the states.
An alternative approach to drafting the statute could cover
even more cases. Rather than regulating gun possession as such,
Congress could regulate commercial transactions involving guns;
Lopez appears to leave regulation of commercial transactions
generally within the commerce power.' Accordingly, Congress
239. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
240. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
241. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see
also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("Respondent was a local student at a local school;
there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there
is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to inter-
state commerce.").
242. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
243. See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (sustaining federal
racketeering conviction as having sufficient nexus to interstate commerce, where
defendant operated gold mine in Alaska using substantial equipment and supplies
purchased in California). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). To
regulate the entire school zone on the basis of the school purchasing interstate sup-
plies might be beyond the holding of Katzenbach. This element could be limited to
possession of a firearm on the grounds of the school itself.
244. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in which
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could prohibit the sale or lease of a firearm to a minor or within
a school zone. As a means of making that prohibition effective,
Congress could also prohibit possession of firearms in a school
zone. Such a regulation would be well within the rationale of
Wickard, which upheld congressional regulation of a farmer
growing and consuming wheat at home, because such activity
affected the market price of wheat.2" Moreover, there would be
no need to show a nexus to interstate commerce in individual
cases, just as Perez upheld application of a general loan-sharking
statute to a wholly intrastate transaction."4 Thus, with respect
to police powers, Lopez does not really create "a distinction be-
tween what is truly national and what is truly local."247 The
reason is that Lopez draws a distinction between commercial and
non-commercial activity, but there is little correlation between
whether an activity is commercial in nature and whether it falls
within an area of traditional state concern. So the effective limits
imposed by Lopez do not mark off areas of traditional concern to
the states but rather cut broad swathes through such areas.
With respect to regulation of education, the analysis is differ-
ent. Lopez reasoned that if Congress could regulate gun posses-
sion because it adversely affected education, then "a fortiori, it
can also regulate the educational process directly."2 According-
ly, Congress could regulate every aspect of state schools, includ-
ing prescribing the curriculum. 9 But the label "a fortiori" is in-
appropriate, because prescriptive regulation is not contained
within prohibitive regulation. The distinction is important, be-
cause such prescriptive regulation invokes other considerations.
In the unlikely event that Congress were to dictate how state
schools were to be run, the rule of New York v. United States
would be applicable."' The issue would be whether Congress
had required the states to play prescribed roles in a federal pro-
gram, or had offered states the opportunity to participate but the
freedom to decline. An attempt by Congress to dictate every as-
pect of how state schooling must be conducted would not survive
such scrutiny. Such analysis provides a much more effective
Justice O'Connor joined, characterized "the congressional power to regulate transac-
tions of a commercial nature [as an] essential principle." Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
245. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
246. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971).
247. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
248. Id. at 1633.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
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protection than Lopez. Under Lopez, Congress could still use
either jurisdictional links to commerce or regulation of commer-
cial transactions to regulate many aspects of education. For ex-
ample, the Lopez view of the Commerce Clause would not pre-
vent Congress from prohibiting the interstate shipment of school
books not included in the federal curriculum (although, of course,
the First Amendment would).
Lopez certainly affirms that the commerce power has lim-
its,25' but as a matter of federalism it does not create special
protection for areas of traditional concern to the states, in the
manner that National League of Cities sought to do for "integral
functions" of state governments. 2 ' Rather, even after the tight-
ening of Lopez, such areas as crime and education will retain far
too many links to interstate commerce to be immune from federal
legislation."n If substantive protections are to be effective, they
are more likely to come in the form of affirmative limits on par-
ticular types of federal legislation, as found in New York v. Unit-
ed States.
254
Thus Lopez, although it relies heavily on principles of state
sovereignty, seems to offer little practical support for the idea
that federalism requires the creation of separate spheres of re-
sponsibility for state and federal governments. In particular, it
undercuts a view of federalism enunciated in Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy, elaborating on views ex-
pressed by Justice O'Connor in earlier cases, characterized feder-
alism as increasing governmental accountability by allocating
governmental functions between the federal and state govern-
ments.25 Because the Constitution divides governmental au-
thority, citizens know whether to hold the federal or state gov-
ernment accountable for failing to fulfill a particular function."6
But Lopez does not completely insulate particular areas of activ-
251. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
252. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
253. The broad array of federal crimes has sparked considerable discussion
about the appropriate functions of the local and national governments. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the Federal and State Governments
in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 965 (1995).
254. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992).
255. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FTC v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992), New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
155-66 (1992) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). Such a rationale can be seen
as consistent with a procedural rationale for federalism. See D. Bruce La Pierre,
Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial
Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 577 (1985).
256. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
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ity from federal regulation but rather leaves considerable room
for overlap. Thus it will not necessarily be clear to a citizen ag-
grieved about a particular social problem in which the govern-
ment has failed to fulfill its regulatory responsibility.
But Lopez does support another conception of federalism. Lopez
is likely to play an important role in providing procedural protec-
tion against changes in the allocation of governmental responsi-
bilities. Although Congress will not be barred from regulating
non-commercial activity of concern to the states, Lopez will re-
quire Congress to address directly issues of federalism in the
legislative process. In order to regulate non-commercial activity,
the statute will need to include explicit jurisdictional links to
interstate commerce or regulate the non-commercial activity as
part of a broader scheme regulating commerce. Congress must
thus directly consider the effects of the proposed regulation on
non-commercial activity and affirmatively state exactly how far it
intends to use its powers. In this sense, the principal effect of
Lopez is that of a clear statement rule. In interpreting ambiguous
federal statutes, the Court avoids interpretations that change
federal-state relations unless the statute is unmistakably clear.
Under the strong formulation of the clear statement rule in Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, the Court will require such federalism issues to
be addressed in every relevant part of the statute. Thus, Con-
gress can only alter the federal balance by addressing the effect
on states clearly and in detail. Lopez, although not a statutory
interpretation case, will have a similar effect. Although Lopez
does not insulate broad areas of non-commercial, non-economic
activity from federal regulation, it will uphold such regulation
only if clear and explicit jurisdictional provisions address the
federalism issues. Thus, the issue of a statute's effect on areas of
traditional concern to the states must necessarily be directly and
specifically addressed if legislation altering the existing balance
is considered, an approach consistent with Garcia's reliance on
the political structure of the Constitution to protect the interests
of the states.-"7
IV. CONCLUSION
Lopez changes the basic structure of Commerce Clause analy-
sis. The modern cases had left an open-ended rule that Congress
could regulate activity that affected interstate commerce. The
Lopez Court did not attempt the impossible task of defining just
257. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-53.
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how substantial such effects must be to sustain regulation. Al-
though the opinion in form followed the "substantial effect on
interstate commerce" approach, it shifted the analysis from the
effect on interstate commerce to whether the regulated activity
itself is commercial. In effect, Lopez concedes that Congress may
regulate commercial and economic activity (whether intrastate or
interstate), but attempts to preserve to the states regulation of
non-commercial and non-economic activity in areas of traditional
concern to the states (even where such activity affects interstate
commerce). The Court drew these limits by implicitly adopting
the approach of its Tenth Amendment cases, looking to state
sovereignty for affirmative limits on the federal power. But the
new approach will probably not succeed in delimiting "truly local"
areas, because Congress will still be able to regulate such areas
through fashioning legislation based on links to commercial or
economic activity.
However, although Lopez will thus not support the "substan-
tive areas" conception of federalism that informs its analysis, it
will contribute to the procedural conception. Congress will need
to address issues of federalism clearly and specifically if a statute
alters the federal-state balance in non-commercial domains. Seen
in this light, the vagueness of the distinctions that Lopez relies
upon are also less troubling. "Economic," "commercial," and "area
of traditional concern to the states" are indeterminate, broad
categories."5 8 If Congress drafts statutes to meet the commerce
power requirements, however, courts will rarely need to apply
those categories in order to decide the constitutionality of the
statute.259 At a time when the extent of the regulatory power of
the federal government has become a matter of intense debate,
Lopez may ultimately amount to a rule encouraging a measure of
deliberation in the political process without hobbling Congress.
258. The Court had little success in applying the categories of "integral" and
"traditional" state governmental functions, which are narrower if no less vague.
259. Such issues may continue to arise in considering the application of a stat-
ute in particular instances. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732
(1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336 (1971).
1995

